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Transmission mechanisms for monetary policy in  
emerging market economies: what is new? 
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1 
In recent years the macroeconomic environment in emerging market economies as well as in 
industrialized countries has become more stable in terms of price stability and growth. 
Nevertheless, international financial markets continue to be a source of uncertainty that 
poses important challenges for monetary policy, particularly in developing economies. The 
rapid integration of financial markets has led to increased capital flows and higher liquidity, 
which contributed to global growth but has also permitted current account imbalances on an 
unprecedented scale, whose correction, if sudden and unexpected, could be harmful and 
costly for emerging markets.  
The improvements in fiscal policies have been remarkably important, leaving monetary policy 
plenty of room for playing its role in stabilizing the economy by providing it with a nominal 
anchor. The movement towards a more active stabilizing role of monetary policy came along 
with more exchange rate flexibility. 
There is no conclusive answer to the question of whether in developing countries, as well as 
in industrialized ones, greater openness and trade integration have been key factors behind 
improvements in inflation. The continuous rise in exports by China, India and other countries 
from East Asia and Eastern Europe clearly became a source of downward pressure on the 
prices of a wide range of goods and services. Whether or not this has in fact contributed to 
the present environment of low inflation, there are significant implications for the conduct of 
monetary policy. There is also a strong and unfinished debate around the role to be played 
by money and the conduct of monetary policy in an environment of higher globalization. 
In the case of Argentina, after 10 years under a currency board regime in which the monetary 
policy was passive, in January 2002, in the middle of a very deep currency and financial 
crisis, there was a move in the direction of exchange rate flexibility and monetary policy 
became active. It is important to recall that the economic recession that began in 1998 
shocked the financial sector, reducing the real volume of banking credit to the private sector 
by practically two thirds. The ratio of bank loans to GDP fell from 24% at the beginning of 
1999 to 8% towards the end of 2004.
2 
In that setting, the process of rebuilding monetary capacity had to be gradual, since no 
instruments or markets were available for the Central Bank of Argentina (BCRA) to influence 
the demand for funds in the financial system at that moment. At the peak of the financial 
crisis, the channels of monetary policy did not work. 
During the first months of 2002, policy actions were implemented to handle the peak of the 
crisis in order to stop both the fall of the peso and the persistent drain of money from banks. 
The BCRA first focused on providing liquidity to financial institutions as much as required to 
avoid a massive bankruptcy and to stabilize the exchange rate market. 
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An initial step to get some control over monetary aggregates was to set up a market for 
BCRA notes and bonds (LEBACs), mainly in pesos, which at that time allowed the BCRA to 
sterilize the monetary effects of assistance to financial institutions. This policy was extremely 
successful in stabilizing expectations and preventing hyperinflation after the sharp 
depreciation that the peso had suffered during the first quarter of 2002. 
Once the BCRA was able to stabilize expectations and get control over the situation of 
financial institutions, it recovered a certain capacity to manage the supply of base money so 
as to preserve certain equilibrium with the demand for funds. Since the interbank market was 
virtually non-existent at that time, the BCRA did not have enough capacity to influence 
liquidity through a reference rate. In the face of these restrictions the BCRA decided to 
conduct monetary policy using an intermediate quantitative monetary target, which since 
2002 has been set under an annual Monetary Program (PM). 
During 2003 and 2004, the central bank designed a Monetary Program, presented to the 
Congress, based on intermediate targets for the broad monetary base (BMB) and other 
monetary aggregates. These quantitative targets are consistent with the inflation target, 
which is one of the main objectives of monetary policy. The targeting of money aggregates is 
consistent with BCRA forecasts for the growth in money demand and for real GDP, and with 
the inflation objective of the BCRA. 
Initially, the target was set for the BMB, the monetary aggregate which the BCRA had the 
most ability to control for two reasons. The first reason was the huge contraction of the 
banking system after the 1998–2001 crisis. The extremely poor impetus of lending activity 
kept the monetary multipliers at low and stable levels, so that the MB summed up most of the 
relevant information about the state of monetary aggregates. The second reason was the 
immediate availability of data on the BMB, so that the BCRA could very rapidly inform the 
public of the performance of the Program, to help to build up its credibility. 
In 2006, based on the empirical evidence that the demand for M2
3 seemed to be more 
related to its inflation goal, CPI inflation, and once money multipliers began a clear recovery, 
the focus for tracking compliance with the Program shifted from the BMB to M2. This change 
was in response to the positive transformations observed in the banking and financial system 
during recent years and will result in a better adjusted control of monetary variables than that 
allowed for by the BMB. 
Thus, the approach of the BCRA during this transition process to a more active role for 
monetary policy has been gradual and pragmatic. This strategy, which is still at work, 
recognizes the various uncertainties faced by the BCRA. It is widely accepted by policy-
makers and academics that, in a world of globalized financial markets, central banks have to 
deal with unexpected changes in the international environment. At the same time, monetary 
policy is also facing uncertainty related to the weak knowledge a central bank has about the 
real model that governs its dynamic interactions with the domestic private sector. 
The particular complexity of the local financial system, the lower degree of monetization in 
the economy, the long periods of macroeconomic instability and the most recent crisis in the 
banking system all suggest that the problems the BCRA faces are much tougher. It is clear 
that the frequent structural changes in Argentina make it even more difficult to interpret the 
evidence shown by its monetary history. 
As mentioned above, the passive monetary policy implemented during the period 1991–
2001, as well as the lasting effects of the currency and financial crises of 2002 on agents’ 
behavior, added important additional uncertainties. In particular, on the way out of the crisis, 
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the BCRA did not have much knowledge of the probable effects of its own policy actions on 
the behavior of economic agents. 
The BCRA had to rebuild the instruments and channels of monetary policy, not only because 
of the disruption created by the currency and financial crises that began in 2001, but also 
because the focus of the Bank in the past decade had been rather different. 
That undertaking has been a main task for the BCRA since 2002. As mentioned before, the 
market for notes and bonds of the central bank, LEBACs and NOBACs, has been steadily 
developing as from that year (Figure 1).
4 
The issuance of central bank notes initially addressed compensation for the expansionary 
effects of the financing to banks during the crisis and the massive selling of foreign reserves 
to sustain the value of the peso. In a second stage, it has been used as an instrument to 
offset the expansionary effects of the precautionary policy of reserve accumulation 
developed by the BCRA, thus preventing monetary aggregates from deviating from the target. 
The central bank has also started active intervention in the repo market to increase the 
responsiveness of the interbank credit market, which shows strong signs of segmentation. 
Such intervention, along with the deepening of the market for central bank notes (LEBAC 
and NOBAC bills) has been helping to generate a benchmark interest rate. The signals are 
sent by means of an interest rate range (floor and ceiling around the reference rate) that 
makes it possible to lower the volatility of the interest rate and regulate money market 
liquidity more efficiently. During this process, the BCRA has also been able to extend the 
maturity of its debt, creating instruments that help monetary policy influence longer-term 
interest rates and thus be more effective in affecting investment, consumption and saving 
decisions. 
Figure 1 
Central bank instruments 
Share of total 
 
                                                  
4   Starting in April 2002, the BCRA issued different types of notes and bonds in different periods, adapting its 
strategy to market conditions (the BCRA issued instruments denominated in pesos and in US dollars, at fixed 
and variable rates). 134  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
Repo transactions are carried out through the REPO trading session of the electronic over-
the-counter market (MAE). Transactions are in pesos, have maturities of up to 30 days, and 
are settled with non-indexed LEBACs as the underlying asset, with a 10% haircut (the value 
of the underlying asset delivered in excess of the pesos received). With the aim of regulating 
liquidity in the money market, the BCRA carries out both repos and reverse repos.
5 
As stressed before, the BCRA had to build knowledge about how monetary impulses are 
transmitted to the real economy and inflation. Although during times of regime change past 
history could not be very informative about the current channels of monetary policy, the 
BCRA has conducted some empirical research on the transmission of monetary impulses to 
the economy.
6 During the period of low inflation (1993–2006), inflation responded 
significantly to interest rate shocks, money growth and nominal exchange rate volatility, in 
that order. 
The results of the research indicate that the interest rate channel is important in the 
transmission of nominal shocks to the real economy and inflation. (Figure 2 illustrates trends 
in money aggregates.) Money aggregates respond negatively, as expected, to shocks to the 
nominal interest rate. The response is rapid and persists for two quarters. Impulses on the 
interest rate also have a rapid negative effect on GDP growth. In this case, the effects of the 
shock remain significant over three quarters. Shocks to money aggregates (money for 
transactions as measured by M1) have a positive but much weaker impact on GDP, and their 
effect lasts for only one quarter. The exchange rate channel also appears to be significant. 
Figure 2 
Ratios of M1 and M2 to GDP 
 
The success of a central bank in ensuring price stability largely depends on its ability to guide 
and coordinate expectations. As part of an effort in this direction, the BCRA has developed a 
Market Expectations Survey (REM). The results of this survey are systematized and 
published by the central bank, in order to make available to the general public forecasts of 
main macroeconomic indicators produced by a large group of private consultants, 
commercial and investment banks as well as academic institutions. The survey summarizes 
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relevant information about market expectations and has become an important reference 
point for domestic and international economic analysts. The results of the survey are also 
used by the central bank in its assessment of the cyclical position of the economy. 
It is important to stress that (despite the research noted above), given the low degree of 
capital deepening and the reduced ratio of private credit to GDP since the 2001–2002 crisis, 
changes in interest rates have a larger effect in the short run on output than on headline 
inflation. At the same time, the above-mentioned lack of full understanding of how 
transmission mechanisms, which are not independent from politics, operate and the fact that 
they are far from being stable in time, limited the scope of monetary policy as an instrument 
for stabilizing economic activity during the first year after the crisis. 
With the progressive recovery of financial intermediation, money multipliers are recuperating 
from the low levels reached during the financial crisis. As public confidence in the domestic 
currency and the local financial system returned, along with a sustained upturn of the real 
economy, financial markets began to recover, and the central bank has been gradually 
gaining control over developments in money and credit markets. The improvement of 
financial intermediation will also allow the credit channel to play a greater role in the 
transmission of monetary impulses to the economy. Since the end of 2004, credit to the 
private sector has been growing very rapidly, at an annual average growth rate of around 
30%. This recovery has been led by short-term credit to firms and households while the 
upturn of mortgages seems to be slower. Despite the strong growth that the sector showed in 
the period 2005–2006, it can be seen from Figure 3 that the ratio of private credit to GDP is 
still at low levels (around 10%). 
Figure 3 
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Source: BCRA. 
The crowding out by the public sector during the last decade has been a steady concern of 
the central bank in the last four years. The proportion of public sector debt in banks’ total 
asset portfolio increased dramatically in the nineties. With the recovery of the real economy, 
the rise of private sector credit demand in conjunction with a better regulatory framework 
allowed banks to reduce their exposure to public sector debt, but the share of such debt in 
total assets is still high. It can be said that the recovery of the real economy after the crises 
was mainly based on self-financing by firms and households. 
In order to help banks recompose their portfolios, the BCRA allowed them to adjust the value 
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account that the central bank wants to prevent banks from being excessively exposed to 
government debt risk as they were in the past (particularly during the late nineties), important 
changes have been introduced in prudential regulations: government debt holdings in banks’ 
“banking book” are now subject to capital requirements that gradually converge to the Basel 
standard (8%). This is a recognition of the risky nature of this asset and the need to prevent 
banks from taking excessive risks. Additionally, the central bank imposed a global limit of 
35% for the total exposure of banks to the public sector. 
The BCRA is also developing policies to stimulate bank financing to the private sector, both 
households and firms, while managing banking risks. For households and small enterprises 
the central bank encourages the use of mathematical techniques, such as credit scoring, 
which require less specific information on debtors. For mortgages, a higher loan to value 
ratio was allowed for tenants with a good rent payment history who do not own a home. 
Incentives for banks to lend to private sector firms and to extend the maturity of such loans 
have also been provided. 
In order for monetary policy to be fully effective, domestic currency must recover a major role 
in transactions and savings. The Argentine economy, and in particular the financial system, 
were highly dollarized (Figure 4). It is important to stress that in a highly dollarized economy 
the speculative money demand is made in a foreign currency. So when macroeconomic 
volatility rises and general confidence in the price of domestic assets falls, there is no 
demand for local currency but only for foreign currency. The result is that a financial crisis 
triggers an external balance crisis. 
After the currency and financial crises of 2002, an active process of de-dollarization of 
financial assets began. The abandonment of the currency board alone implied the end of the 
implicit currency insurance created by the Convertibility Law. The central bank accompanied 
this process with several regulatory changes aiming to de-dollarize bank balance sheets and 
prevent them from taking excessive currency risk.  
On the one hand, financial restrictions were introduced on the use of dollar deposits and 
higher bank reserves were required against such deposits. Restrictions were also imposed 
on the allocation of foreign currency denominated deposits by banks. Such deposits now can 
only be applied to financing tradable sector firms or to long-run investment projects which 
foster export sector production. The measure seeks to prevent the solvency risk created in 
the previous decade by unrestricted foreign currency financing to debtors whose income was 
denominated in the domestic currency. 
Figure 4 
Dollarisation ratio 
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Finally, it is important to mention that the de-dollarization of financial assets has been 
significant: the share of peso deposits to total deposits increased from 34% in 2001 to 90% 
at the end of 2006. 
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